Macroeconomic Shocks and the Nonfinancial Corporate Sector
Robust demand growth and easy external and domestic financing conditions for the corporate sector have been a feature of emerging market economies (EMEs) in Latin America and Asia for much of the past decade-with a brief interruption following the Lehman crisis (Figure 1 ). In the most financially integrated countries in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, hereafter the "LA5"), favorable conditions have gone alongside strong corporate profitability and valuation, contained leverage ratios, and improved maturity exposures vis-à-vis other EMEs (Figure 2 ).
But how deeply seated is this corporate performance? Would firms in the LA5 countries be able to withstand a change in macroeconomic conditions? Delving deeply into these questions is critical for two reasons. First, boom episodes may induce vulnerabilities-for instance, when firms' assets become overvalued, they can borrow based on inflated collateral; further, abundant capital inflows can raise foreign currency exposures in unhedged firms. 1 A cursory glance at corporate _______ * Based on González-Miranda (2012). indicators can fail to detect the buildup of risks, since these may become distorted by asset overvaluation, high leverage, or currency appreciation. 2 Second, a vulnerable corporate sector-that is, one composed of overleveraged firms with large short-term maturity exposures and low buffers-can transmit and/or magnify real or financial shocks, weakening a country's macroeconomic resilience.
This note examines a broad range of corporate indicators in the LA5 countries-seeking to establish stylized facts regarding the region's corporate health. To do so, it proposes a simple framework to assess corporate vulnerability to a sudden stop of financing external to firms (from both domestic and foreign sources), taking into ____________________________________________ 1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) . 2 The debt-asset ratio may not signal an excessive buildup during booms as asset values trend up; an increase in foreign liabilities may not be reflected as a rise in leverage when the currency appreciates. 
Some Stylized Facts
We base our analysis on publicly traded firm-level data from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database (see Appendix). The data have caveats, including that they cover only a fraction of each country's corporate sector. This said, the database is useful for gauging vulnerabilities not only because alternatives are scant, but because publicly traded firms are relatively large-and, hence, of macroeconomic relevance. For LA5 countries, the size of the aggregate assets of firms in the sample ranges from 20 percent of GDP in Peru to over 120 percent of GDP in Chile, on average, during the period 2000-11 (Table 1) .
A View by Sector of Economic Activity
We first review the health of the corporate sector in the region from a sector-wide perspective. 
A View by Individual Country
An analysis of corporate indicators by country also reveals some vulnerabilities ( Figure 4 ):
 Leverage is higher in some countries following the Lehman crisis. This is the case in Brazil, where weighted average debt exceeds pre-Lehman levels at about 30 percent of assets, and weighted average debtsales nears 100 percent (panels A1-A2). Moreover, debt-sales ratios in Brazil have increased also for the median firm, although they remain at more manageable levels (panel B2). Leverage has risen in Colombia and Mexico as well, but to lower levels, especially relative to sales. As a benchmark, firms in South Korea had (weighted) average debt-asset ratios of around 50 percent and debt-sales ratios of 100 percent in the 1997-98 crisis. 7
 Short-term debt exposures declined in all LA5 countries following the Lehman crisis. However, these exposures rebounded somewhat for the median firm in 2011-markedly in Peru, and more moderately in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In contrast, they have continued to decline in Colombia.
 Profitability performance has been mixed. Earnings to total assets have fallen in Brazil and Chile, but have grown strongly in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, especially for the largest firms (Panels A6-B6).
 Buffer trends have been mixed. Liquidity-measured by the quick ratio-improved in most countries after Lehman for both the largest and median firms, except in Colombia (panels A4-B4).
Collateral (with the fixed-to-total-asset ratio as a proxy) fell in most countries, both for the weighted average and the median firm (panels A5-B5). 8
Assessing Corporate Exposures to Sudden Stops
While indicators point at rising leverage and reduced buffers in some LA5 countries, they cannot-by themselves-answer whether those trends are strong enough to make the corporate sector vulnerable to a sudden stop of financing external to the firm (be it from foreign or domestic sources). To address this question, we use a simple panel probit model, estimated on data for 3,100 nonfinancial _______ 7 Coricelli and others (2010) and Medina (2012) derive thresholds for the debt-asset ratios above which growth/recovery from a crisis becomes more difficult; these range from 40 to 48 percent. 8 A firm's quick ratio is the ratio of its liquid (short-term) assets (net of inventories) to its short-term liabilities.
firms in 18 EMEs and small advanced economies (including the LA5 countries), for 2000-11. The model seeks to identify firms that are more likely to be vulnerable to interruptions in financing availability; its dependent variable is a dummy equal to one whenever a firm's cash flow falls below its short-term debt obligations (the sum of short-term debt plus long-term debt falling due within a year)-an event that would require the firm to roll over its debt, exposing it to a worsening in financing conditions. 9
The regressors of the equation belong to one of six categories (Appendix) We estimate a "base model" (Table 2 , Panels 1A-2A) based on two measures of leverage: the debtasset ratio and the debt-sales ratio. The results suggest that:
 Leverage and maturity exposures raise a firm's probability of becoming vulnerable to a sudden stop, whereas larger buffers reduce this probability. 10 Also, in line with the literature, there is evidence that larger firms tend to be more resilient to financing shocks.
 Buoyant demand conditions lessen a firm's exposure to a sudden stop, whereas adverse global shocks increase it.
Greater domestic demand growth significantly reduces vulnerability; terms-of-trade growth (external demand) has the expected negative sign but is not statistically significant-suggesting, perhaps, that the average firm in the sample is not a net exporter. Adverse global shocks-rising
This measure has been used in corporate liquidity stress tests (Hviding and Papi, 2002) , identifying the risk that a firm may not cover its debt falling due if financing stops. The measure is stricter than the commonly used index of ability to pay, known as the coverage ratio (earnings before taxes and depreciation and amortization of assets as a share of interest expense due), which assumes principal can be rolled over (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . 10 Results are in line with those by Medina (2012) and Coricelli and others (2010) .
global risk aversion (measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, or VIX) and higher oil prices-add to the probability of a firm's becoming vulnerable to a funding shock.
 Greater availability of domestic bank financing tends to dampen the exposure to a sudden stop, whereas easy access to external financing may magnify it. This result is in line with the crisis literature, which suggests that abundant foreign inflows can facilitate the buildup of foreign liability exposures, 11 especially when there are credit constraints in the domestic market.
 The average firm in the sample seems not to be exportoriented and has net exposures in foreign currency. Lacking firm-level data on foreign currency exposures, we include the nominal exchange rate depreciation in the model to capture its impact on firms' balance sheets and cash flows. The estimated coefficient is significant and positive, implying that firms are, on average, vulnerable to large exchange rate changes-due to the cost effect on their imported inputs, or the high net foreign currency liability exposures.
 Exchange rate flexibility helps reduce corporate vulnerabilities. We include two policy variables: a dummy that equals one when countercyclical fiscal policies are pursued, and an index of exchange rate regime flexibility. 12 Estimates show that greater exchange rate flexibility is a relevant mitigating factor of corporate vulnerabilityconsistent with the literature that argues that greater exchange rate flexibility induces firms to hedge to reduce their net currency exposures. 13 The fiscal policy dummy is not statistically significant.
A second specification of the model draws from the early warning indicators literature and replaces the value of each firm-level variable with its ordering in the country-specific distribution for such variable in 2000-11. 14 With this, a large firm from a small country is still treated as a large firm in the full panel, and specific countries' greater or lower "tolerance" to corporate leverage or maturity exposures is accounted for. Our results are robust to this specification (Table 2 , Panels 1B/2B). 15 We use the model results to construct a measure of the degree of corporate vulnerability in the LA5 countries. A "vulnerable" firm is defined as one for which the predicted probability of being exposed to a sudden stop is greater than or equal to 50 percent. The number of vulnerable firms (estimated in each specification of the model) as a share of the total _______ 12 The index ranges from 1 to 4 depending on the IMF's classification of the country in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 13 See Kamil (2012) . 14 See Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhardt (1998) , and Berg and Pattillo (1998) . 15 Results are robust under a Heckman selection model that controls for built-in survivorship bias (Gonzalez-Miranda, 2012) . number of firms in the country sample in every year is plotted in Figure 5 .
All countries registered an increase in the share of vulnerable firms in the year following the Lehman crisis (2009). The share of "vulnerable" firms has trended down since then; however, by end-2011, it remained higher than in 2007 in the case of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Brazil had a relatively low increase at the time of the Lehman crisis, although the share of vulnerable firms has been relatively high throughout the period under analysis.
In sum, the results suggest that the interplay of firmlevel indicators and macroeconomic conditions has been such that, by end-2011, the number of firms in the LA5 countries that had a high probability of facing difficulties in securing financing in the case of a dry up in funding availability was higher than in 2007. Firms more likely to require market access are also relatively more vulnerable to a sharp reversal in financing conditions.
Policy Implications
An in-depth look at financial corporate indicators in LA5 countries suggests that leverage may be building up in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico-albeit from manageable starting points and with improving maturity structures. A probit model also suggests that, although vulnerabilities have fallen since the peak of the 2008-09 crisis, they persist throughout the region and are possibly higher than in 2007. Results suggest the presence of foreign currency liability exposures and illustrate the risks that may be posed by abundant external financing. From a broader perspective, these results provide support to the advice of using macro-prudential policies to limit the effects of strong capital inflows. They also show that more flexible exchange rate regimes help reduce corporate vulnerabilities.
Appendix: Data
We use firm-level balance sheet and cash flow data for some 3,100 publicly traded companies, available from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. The sample selected includes firms from 18 countries from nonfinancial sectors, for the period 2000-11 (Table A1) . A number of adjustments are made to the data:
 Timing correction. For firms ending their fiscal year on or after January 15, Thomson Reuters Worldscope assigns their data to the current calendar year. We reassign data for firms reporting on or before June 30 to the previous calendar year, to better align those data with the timing of macroeconomic data.
 Treatment of outliers. Outliers are defined as observations at eight or more standard deviations, based on the country-specific distribution.
 Varying sample. The firm sample varies by country and year; the analysis provides for a robustness check vis-à-vis built-in survivorship bias via a Heckman selection model (see Gonzalez-Miranda, 2012) .
Macroeconomic data (Table A2) Table 2 .
Additional databases used include Haver (for the VIX) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) locational statistics on cross-border inflows by country.
